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The simplest and best known models of interactions in classical mechanics are the ones 
which describe exchange of energy, of linear momentum or of electric charge between small 
macroscopic objects, such as balls. I will show that the set of principles classically used to 
account for what happens in Newton’s cradle does not really account for what happens in 
Newton’s cradle and that, moreover, it predicts possible behaviors that are never observable 
(this, obviously, is not an original contribution but the demonstration is not so old, is 
generally ignored in school books though it deserves being remembered, and will be useful 
for the purpose of this paper). 
Simpler even is the model generally used when dealing with signal and its propagation; it 
is that model, however, that is almost universally used as a model of human communication. 
We will see some of the deplorable and piteous consequences of that carelessness on the way 
meaning is studied in linguistics and on the possible results of such studies. I will suggest a 
more serious, though more difficult, way to represent human communication and will 
examine its consequences on the linguistic approaches to describe the meaning of natural 
language expressions and account for the semantic phenomena. 
1. From ball to balls: carelessness as a generalized intellectual 
system? 
The simplest and best known models of interactions between material entities are the ones 
which describe exchange of energy, of linear momentum or of electric charge between small 
macroscopic objects, such as balls. Let us examine, for instance, the typical scenario of 
Newton’s cradle, when only one of its balls is thrown, as illustrated in Picture 1. 
 
Picture 1: a material realization of Newton’s cradle1 
The classical description of the observable interactions can be summed up as follows: 
“When the ball at one end is pulled aside and released it collides with the remaining 
stationary balls and the ball at the other end of the row moves off to reach what 
appears to be the same height from which the first ball was released. All the other 
balls are apparently at rest.” [Gauld 2006: 597] 
                                                
1 Picture from file: Newtons_cradle_animation_book_2.gif, under free Creative Commons License. Author: Dominique 
Toussaint; date: 2006/08/08. 
From this observation, many school books and didactic web pages (erroneously) conclude 
that “the effect of the collision simply consisted in the exchange of velocities between both 
balls”2. Considering the situation in which more than one ball is pulled and released allows to 
slightly better that conclusion, but, as we will see, not to correct it. The cases with more than 
one ball can be described as follows: 
If two balls are pulled aside and released, after the collision two balls move off – 
again apparently to the same height – with the rest stationary. Releasing three balls 
results in three balls moving off after the collision. 
In those cases, clearly, velocity is not enough and school books are forced to introduce the 
notion of momentum conservation and, for some of them, that of energy conservation. 
More precisely, the ‘explanation’ goes like this : 
Ball A (system A) which was separated from the other four (B, C, B', A'), after being 
released, meets the remaining balls (system [BCB'A']), and transmits its momentum to the 
system [ABCB'A']. In the theoretical conditions of the experiment, it is assumed that there 
is no loss of momentum or energy. System [ABCB'A'] then transmits, energy and momen-
tum to ball A' (opposite to A), which separates in turn; the system is thus in a position 
symmetrical to the initial situation, in which A' plays the role of A and vice versa. 
However, this reasoning does not explain why A’ moves off alone (and, more generally, 
why the number of balls which move off after collision is equal to the number of balls which 
provoked collision). Gauld (2006) reveals an interesting but rather startling fact connected to 
this lack of explanation: none of the 40 scholar books he studied considers that question as 
requiring an explanation…  
“About one third of about 40 tertiary physics textbooks sampled contained some 
reference to Newton’s Cradle […] However, it is interesting to note that, in spite of 
the apparent simplicity of the demonstration, the behaviour of Newton’s Cradle is 
not adequately explained in these textbook presentations and there may not even be a 
fully adequate explanation available in the physics education literature.” 
  [Gauld (2006): 598); my emphasis] 
Gauld wryly adds, further on:  
“One might excuse teaching which is ignorant of little known facts but it is less easy 
to excuse facts about the apparatus which are more easy to establish such as that the 
principles of conservation of momentum and kinetic energy are not sufficient, in 
themselves, to explain the behaviour of Newton’s Cradle.”  [ibid. p. 615] 
And this enormous cheating (if we may so call what Gauld pointed out) was so, in 2006, in 
spite of the fact that Herrmann & Schmälzle (1981) had shown that the use of the two usual 
conservation principles (momentum and kinetic energy) is not sufficient to describe the facts 
observed. 
For instance, in the case of an initial impact with one ball (A), energy and momentum 
conservation would not prevent that A bounced with a speed equal to one third of the initial 
velocity, while A' and B' separate with a speed equal to two thirds of the initial velocity of A. 
Indeed, as Herrmann & Schmälzle (1981:762) develops:  
                                                
2 Translated from the French Wikipedia page on Newton’s Cradle: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pendule_de_Newton (still 
visible on December 30th 2013). 
  
“Imagine now the following final state: ball 1 moves to the left with v = (-1 /3)v0, 
balls 2 and 3 move to the right, both with the same speed v = (2/3)v0. It is easy to 
confirm that the values of the kinetic energy and the momentum of this hypothetical 
final state are the same as those of the initial state: 
Ek = (l/2)m[(l/3)v0]2 + 2(l/2)m[(2/3)v0]2  
 = (1/2)mv02,  
P = m[(-1/3)v0] + 2m(2/3)v0 
 = mv0. 
Thus energy and momentum would be conserved. Nevertheless, the actual 
experiment always evidences another outcome.” 
The following fanciful illustration gives an idea of the possible (but not actual, of course) be-
havior of the cradle when applying only momentum and kinetic energy conservation 
principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1: fanciful non-actual behavior of cradle (compatible with the classical explanation)  
Since that behavior was never observed, there must be another constraint which the cradle 
must satisfy.  
Herrmann and Schmälzle (1981:763-764) argue that “In a non-dispersion-free system, 
energy and momentum are distributed throughout the entire arrangement.”, while what we 
observe is that the total energy and momentum of the incoming balls is transferred to the same 
number of balls at the other end of the chain. They thus propose a simple explanation 
involving a third conservation principle, shock wave energy conservation, allowing the 
kinetic energy transmitted by A to [ABCB'A'] to be transferred without loss to A’, through the 
initial shock wave. This constraint allows to take into account the propagation of the double 
perturbation wave due to the initial shock, perturbations which travel across the system in 
each of the two directions, and move backwards after reaching the system ends, without 
attenuation, and therefore, at the same speed. It is at the point where the two wave packets 
meet that the balls separate; this point must be symmetrical to the point of impact in order for 
the two wave packets to travel the same distance before they meet. The following schema 
illustrates this point: 
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Schema 1: explanation using the (additional) dispersion-free constraint 
Extremely reassuring and fresh did I thus feel the proposal presented in 2010 by a group of 
secondary school students to the French Physics Olympiad, and… primed with the first prize. 
For they address that specific problem in a way that is both correct and amusing, and propose 
a solution which is both amusing and… correct. 
Nicolas BELIAEFF, Romain HEIMLICH and Baptiste JEANIN, from the Lycée Jean 
Eiffel (Dijon, France), formulate their conception of the problem in this way: 
« [Nous] nous sommes alors demandés comment la dernière bille, qui n’a pas assisté 
au cours de physique, a pu savoir qu’elle devait conserver énergie cinétique et 
quantité de mouvement. »  
“[We] then wondered how the last ball, which did not follow the physics class, could 
know that it was supposed to preserve both kinetic and momentum” 
[Beliaeff et al. (2010)] 
And they immediately propose a hypothetic answer, the validation of which is the object of 
their exposition: 
« Nous avons alors supposé que ces informations devaient être envoyées par la 
première bille et que le son ou la vibration due au choc devait contenir ces 
informations. » 
“We then made the hypothesis according to which this information was sent by the 
first ball and that sound or vibration due to the initial shock should contain this 
information” [ibid.] 
I cannot resist the temptation to show the way in which this hypothesis is discussed and 
illustrated in their work, where ludic goes together with lucid, and ‘ludicity’ seems to be a real 
warrant for lucidity… a brief sequence of schemata, with their comments, will be enough to 
give an idea and, I hope, the intellectual pleasure. 
A   B 
A   B A   B 
A 
 Schema 2: explanation using the hypothesis ‘sound as a messenger’ (adapted from Beliaeff et al. (2010)) 
2. From balls to Human Being: the… impact of communication 
The standard communication model used for signal processing, since Shannon (1948) and 
Shannon & Weaver (1949), can be summarized in the following proposition 
A sender encodes a message and emits the result of the encoding towards a receiver, 
which perceives it in an environment possibly disturbed by other transmissions (noise), 
and then performs the decoding. 
That conception of signal transmission allowed to give an operational definition of informa-
tion: information, within signal study, is the inverse of noise3. 
The communication model underlying that important work on signal was ‘sold’ to 
linguistics, though it was intended only for signal4. Roman Jakobson (1960) did feel the 
model was insufficient to account for human verbal communication but believed that, with a 
few ‘patches’5, it could be used as a first approximation. A version of Shannon and Weaver’s 
signal model, ‘patched’ by Jakobson and simplified ‘for didactic purposes’ (henceforth: STD) 
is still constantly taught as the model of human communication ‘discovered’ by Jakobson… 
Paying attention to the structure of the signal treatment diagram (STD), as it is adapted for 
human communication (with ‘patches’ and ‘didactic’ simplification), one easily realizes that it 
                                                
3 Several cynical theorists argue that that is the reason why the century turn, with its ubiquitous glorification of public 
communication, has drowned information in an ocean of noise; in particular in the realm of scientific research, where the 
commandment “Publish or perish!” engulfs genuine scientific information in a tsunami of noxious waffle… 
4 It seems that the ‘transaction’ was done in spite of Shannon’s doubts, for whom the signal model is not proper for anything 
else than signal. 
5 Cf. the six famous functions of languages he introduced in Jakobson (1960), and which are taught in practically all the 
classes of linguistics in France. 
  
 
 
 The left ball is released on the rest of the system 
 At the moment of the shock one part of the sound propa-
gates towards the right; the other part comes back towards 
the left (this explains the slight bounce of the left ball). 
 Then, the two shock waves move towards the right and 
go on their way towards the opposite end. 
 The two shock waves meet again but, this time, at the 
other end. 
 Finally, the ball at the right end is bounced away 
because of the ‘shock’ between the two shock waves. 
2
 
 
is even simpler than the one which does not work for Newton’s cradle. The following schema 
illustrates the model in question. 
Schema 3: STD – an adaptation of the signal model to human linguistic communication 
For linguistic studies, the transmission process is not an object of study; on the other hand 
neither the encoding and decoding processes, nor the original and ‘reconstructed’ messages 
(illustrated here by compositions of , and ) are observable… However, as any linguist is 
as good a speaker as any other speaker (which is certainly true), most of the linguists (mista-
kenly) consider that the non-observability of the processes, of the original message or of the 
‘reconstructed’ message poses no problem: from the output of the sender, the linguist ‘knows’ 
the message he/she (the sender) encoded; and, at the same time, ‘knows’ what the receiver will 
get when decoding the transmission and ‘reconstructing’ the message6. The discussion of this 
magic belief is not the subject of this paper7 and I sufficiently suggested what I think of it (for 
some, even too much…): I only intend to show, here, that (independently of its magic touch) 
the model in question, STD, is a caricatural simplification of the one that does not work for 
Newton’s cradle and, as such, is not likely to work for more complex interactions, such as 
human linguistic communication.  
If we want to merge the description of what happens in Newton’s cradle and the descrip-
tion of what, according to STD, happens in human linguistic communication, we get 
something that may look like schema 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schema 4: a cradle-like approach to the signal-like model of human communication 
where the impact of ball S corresponds to the transmission of the encoded message through 
the three balls in the middle, and the separation of ball R corresponds to the result of decoding 
                                                
6 This would seem absurd to any other researchers and, probably, to any other human being; but not for most linguists. 
7 For elements of that discussion, see, for instance, Raccah (2005), Raccah (2011a), or Raccah (2011b: 154-161); those who 
read Russian can find in Raccah (2011c) a few proposals for a linguistic experimental approach to semantics. 
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the received encoded message. However, when observing the cradle, the separation of ball R 
is observable (and the properties of that separation –momentum and amplitude– are 
measurable), while, when observing human communication from the point of view of STD, as 
we saw it in the preceding paragraph, what R understands, which corresponds to the separa-
tion of the ball, is not observable. In addition, in the cradle, what caused the impact is also 
observable and its properties measurable, while, in the signal approach to human communica-
tion, again, what precedes the emission of the encoded message is not observable (let alone 
measurable). 
To make a short story short, the scheme of human communication based on the signal 
model (STD) does not predict anything empirically observable: it cannot, thus, account for 
anything that would not be believed in advance (in particular, it does not say anything about 
how meaning or what meaning is constructed by the recipient); and, of course, it is immuniz-
ed against scientific refutation. 
In the next section, I will discuss several properties a model for human communication 
should show and, as a conclusion, I will propose a model of linguistic interaction which does 
show these properties and does not suffer from the weaknesses of STD. 
3. From Human Being to Human Being: the… impact on 
communication 
Regardless of nonsensical but abundant literature bad uses of good but limited models 
produce, there are  
(i) observable entities which are transmitted from S to R in a human communication 
between them (excluding meanings, intentions or messages), and  
(ii) possible observable reactions by R (excluding what R understood), which may allow 
an observer to produce hypotheses about how R understood S’s communicative move.  
Moreover, 
(iii) a sufficiently large set of interaction instances necessarily gives the cues which allow 
to grasp the semantic rules of a human language; this is so because any dunce can 
acquire, and does acquire, a human language in 18-24 months, being exposed only to 
speech and human attitudes. 
In addition, an acceptable conception of human communication has to take into account 
other problems that could not even be conceived within STD: 
1. In human linguistic communication, the meaning of what the ‘sender’ is about to say is 
accessible to no one (not even him(her)self) before (s)he speaks8. 
2. If sound is transmitted indeed (like in the school students conception of the cradle), 
meaning is not: it is constructed by the ‘receiver’ (in particular, on the basis of the 
stimulations that that sound occasioned). 
3. Understanding a discourse (or any utterance of a human language sequence) does not 
involve encoding or decoding9 
4. Understanding a discourse (or any utterance of a human language sequence) is an 
irrepressible and unconscious activity10. 
                                                
8 Cf. Raccah (2008): 72-75. 
9 See Rastier (1995), Raccah (1998), and/or Grillo (2003). 
10 See Bruxelles et al. (1992). 
If we go on exploring what is beyond the sole signal, it is clear that what S transmits to R 
(sound), (a) S too perceives it, (b) R (sometimes) reacts to it, (c) S too (sometimes) reacts to 
it, (d) S reacts to what she/he perceived of R’s reaction, etc. The picture, thus, looks much 
more like the playful approach of the cradle, as presented by the high school students (with 
something running in both direction) than like the static simplification of the ‘linguistic’ 
model based on the signal model. Scheme 5 is an attempt to include these considerations into 
scheme 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schema 5: schema 4 with feed back loop 
The difficulty we underlined in the last section, the fact that reactions are not necessarily 
directly observable (in particular, what is understood by R is not directly observable), is not 
solved but, here, it is not hidden: R’s reaction is present in the schema, and the experimenta-
list semanticist must design experiments which will allow to indirectly observe these 
reactions. The inclusion of the sort of feed-back loop in the presentation of what happens in 
communication allows to avoid two incredible mistakes, due to STD, which are quite often 
present in the implicit background of semantic work: 
1. Discourse meaning, that the semanticist indirectly observes, and that will help him/her 
describe sentence meaning, is not the one (s)he him(her)self built, but one (s)he can 
show that this is what the receiver constructed: the last one requires arguments, while 
the first is based solely on intuition. 
2. In order to be in the position to make (and argue) the hypothesis that the ‘receiver’ built 
utterance meaning S for discourse D, in the situation i, it is necessary to take into 
account the reactions of said ‘receiver’, and make abductive testable hypotheses about 
discourse meaning, which could explain these reactions. 
Verbal reactions of R are not to be favored: they require interpretation by the semanticist, and 
thus introduce subjectivity in his/her observation. In the lack of better empirical material, one 
can be happy with them for a first approximation. However, this subjectivity regards the same 
area of research that we want to scientifically explore: there might soon be biases and 
conflicts of interest... 
4. As a conclusion: a proposal for a model of human communication 
We saw that the conception of human communication, STD, implicitly or explicitly used 
by most linguists all over the world is a simplified version of the model used for the treatment 
of signal. We also saw that that model is a simpler model of interactions with respect to the 
one mistakenly used to account for what happens in Newton’s cradle: in addition to momen-
tum and kinetic energy conservation, another principle is needed, namely what I called the 
shock wave energy conservation principle. I showed that the communication model STD, 
derived from the signal model, could make no empirical prediction, and I pointed out that 
several of its implicit assumptions are erroneous. I suggested that, modifying those 
assumptions implied a radical change in the conception of human communication, and adding 
Blabla 
R
S 
an analogue of the shock wave conservation principle (which allows to take feedback into 
account) could yield to a much more interesting conception of human communication. 
If I convinced the reader, I could be satisfied, even though one might argue that criticizing 
is easier than proposing… Luckily enough, I do have something to propose, which stems from 
all that critical work: a conception of human communication using language, which proceeds 
from a more general Communication Activity Representation conception (CAR). One of the 
advantages of this conception (from the point of view of the present paper) is that it does use 
the reflection developed here about Newton’s cradle and the contrast between what is 
observable (for instance, the separation of the last ball) and what we use in order to account 
for it (principles), which is not observable. Another advantage (which might appear, at first, 
as an inconvenient) is that, once the proposal is understood, it seems to be so evident that it 
becomes difficult to envisage it as a real original conception of communication. This charac-
teristic is an advantage because any move that is done to defend the idea that the said 
conception is too obvious to be a real original proposal is, ipso facto, an evidence in favor of 
that conception… 
The proposal, called the Manipulatory Conception of Human Communication Using 
Language (in short, MCC) is the following: 
When S communicates with R, S manipulates R to get 
R to construct the meaning S wants R to construct 
 
Illustration 2: MCC, in short 
The sounds emitted by S do not carry meaning, but act on R to make R construct a specific 
meaning for S’s utterance. The meaning R will create is, as we said, influenced by S’s 
utterance, but also depends on R’s knowledge and beliefs: what S produces (S’s utterance) 
functions as a set of instructions which R carries out or implement, and which have the effect 
of making him/her build this specific sense. R’s internal process is not conscious: obviously, 
R may build an a posteriori picture of ‘what happened’ in his/her mind, but the understanding 
process is not accessible while it takes place. The process itself is not directly observable: no 
one can access such internal processes (and, as we just saw, not even the person in which it 
takes place), but, sometimes, the outcome of the process provokes observable facts, which can 
be used to formulate abductive hypotheses about some aspects of the process. The process of 
meaning construction is also irresistible: the state of being a speaker of some natural language 
forces to understand any understandable utterance using that language. 
For instance, about one half of the Anglophone American citizens might feel 
uncomfortable when hearing the following utterance: 
 John Doe is a Republican but he is honest 
This is so because the hearers cannot understand the utterance if they do not –at least 
provisionally, during the time of the process– accept that there is some kind of opposition 
between being a Republican and being honest. Interestingly enough, the other half (if we 
except the few semanticists that might belong to it) usually do not even notice that they have 
to accept such a point of view on Republicans: the semantic instruction acts unconsciously 
and irresistibly until it eventually leads to a point of view which is inconsistent with the 
S R 
hearer’s. When this contradiction does not occur, there is no reason for the hearer to be 
conscious of all the points of view (s)he had to accept in order to understand. When the 
contradiction does occur, the hearer often feels aggressed: for good reasons since (s)he has 
been forced to accept (even provisionally) a point of view which (s)he does not share. 
What has just been said about the oral modality is relevant, with very little changes, for 
written material. This might surprise because oral and written material differ in nature: each 
time one reads a written segment, (s)he produces a new utterance, different from one 
produced by another reading, and which is usually treated as new oral material (a sort of inner 
voice). However biologically different might be the initial effect of real sound input from the 
more abstract effect of a reading, one of the very interesting properties of human language 
processing is that, at the level of complexity of  semantic treatment, they should not, and 
cannot, be differentiated: as far as meaning assignment for natural language expressions is 
concerned, no distinction is to be made between inner voice and outer voice. This astonishing 
property, which is characteristic of a separate scientific field for the study of language, is 
certainly related to the level of abstraction at which the complex processes of understanding 
take place; it does deserve more investigation, but this aspect of the question is both outside 
the domain of researches on language as such, and outside the reach of the present work: we 
will have to limit ourselves to signal the question. 
Although MCC is too general to be a model, it may yield to sound models of human 
communication, grasped through its interactive aspect (as we saw in section 2, this is not true 
about the conception based on STD): in MCC, there is an observable input (sound or written 
material) and there may be observable outputs (reactions), in such a way that the non directly 
observable intermediates (meanings, representations, points of view, beliefs, etc.) can be 
indirectly observed, in a way analogous to how momentum, for instance, can be indirectly 
observed. The relationship between the added value of MCC and the correct account for 
Newton’s cradle is the fact that, in MCC, S knows whether his/her action on R succeeded by 
interpreting R’s reactions: the global effect of the interaction lies thus on the meeting point 
between the two actions packets. 
Clearly STD and MCC are two incompatible competitive CARs. Now why should you buy 
the new CAR I propose? The first reason is, obviously, because your old CAR is out of 
order… More seriously, STD blocks the evolution of the accounts of human communication 
and of human language semantics because the oversimplified concepts it uses presuppose, as 
we have just seen, facts about communication and about language that we now know wrong. 
It may have been useful when the tracks leading to findings about human languages were 
narrow; but the map of knowledge on this subject has evolved since that time and you should 
not use your old CAR in the expressways that are available for scientifically exploring this 
territory. 
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